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Abstract 
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the 
proposed mechanism to some status quo alternntive. If the payoffs in the status quo depend on 
strategic actions based on the players' beliefs, then the inferences players make in the event 
someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the prirticipation constraints. We include 
this possibility for learning from disagreement by modeling the mechanism design problem as a 
ratification game in which privately informed players simultaneously vote for or against the 
proposed mechanism. We develop and illustrate a new concept, ratifiability, that takes account of 
this inferencing problem in a consistent way. Requiring a mechanism to be ratifiable can either 
strengthen or weaken the standard participation constraints that arise in mechanism design 
problems. 
*Yale School of Management and California Institute of Technology, respectively. We thank Jeff 
Banks, Steve Matthews, Preston McAfee, Joel Sobel, and numerous seminar participants for 
valuable comments. We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for support. 
Mechanism design is a powerful theory for studying incentive problems in settings where 
privately informed decision-makers have conflicting interests. In a typical application of the 
mechanism design approach, the analyst is able to characterize the set of outcomes that are 
attainable by the agents, recognizing each agent's voluntary participation and incentive to 
misrepresent information that is privately known. Jn addition, it is often possible to characterize 
"optimal" mechanisms - mechanisms th<1t are efficient in either an ex ante or interim sense. 
Despite these significant virtues, one can argue th<1t the mechanism design approach identifies 
too large a set of attainable outcomes, because it allows the agents to make unreasonable 
commitments, both before and after the selection of a mechanism. Commitment becomes an issue 
if information is leaked during the selection or implementation of a me�hanism. The information 
leakage alters the incentive problem faced by the agents, creating opportunities for renegotiation. 
An inability to commit to not using leaked information typically reduces the set of attainable 
outcomes, because additional incentive constraints must be satisfied. Several authors have focused 
on the commitment problem face by agents as a result of information leakage during the 
implementation of a mechanism. See, for example, Ausubel and Deneckere (1987), Cai1laud and 
Hermalin (1989), Cramton (1985), and Green and Laffont (1984, 1985). 
Others have addressed the related problem of information leaked during the process of selecting 
a mechanism. For example, Myerson (1981) and Ma.skin and Tiro!e (1988, 1990) analyze the 
problem a privately informed principal has in selecting a mechanism recognizing that the selection 
may reveal information to the subordinates. Ideally, the principal would like to condition her choice 
of mechanism on her private information, but to do so would reveal information and hence make 
the chosen mechanism invalid, assuming it is based on the prior beliefs of the suhordinates. 
One way around this problem of information leakage during the selection of a mechanism is to 
assume that the agents select the mechanism in the ex ante stage, before they have their private 
information. But even if selection is done by uninformed agents, once the agents learn their private 
information - the interim stage - they may have an incentive to renegotiate to a different 
mechanism, as Holmstrom and Myerson (1981) demonstrate. Again, if the agents are unable to 
commit to not renegotiating, then the set of attainahle outcomes is further constrained. 
Here we focus on each agent's decision to participate in the mechanism and explore the 
possibility that a refusal to participate may reveal information. To isolate this information leakage 
problem from the others, we assume: 
The proposed mechanism is selected by an uninformed third-party, so no information is 
revealed by its selection. 
The agents can commit to not renegotiating to an alternative proposal at the interim stage, thus 
avoiding the durability prob!e1n discussed in Holmstrom and Myerson (198.1) and Crawford 
(1985). 
The agents voluntarily decide to participate in the mechanism at the interim stage. If 
participation is unanimous, then the agents are bound by the mechanism; otherwise, they play 
a status quo gan1e, possibly with altered beliefs. In either case, the agents are ultimately 
committed to the mechanism or the status quo and cannot renegotiate during implementation. 
A special case of this model is widely found in the mechanism design literature, where it is typically 
assumed that nothing is learned fr01n selection, that the agents can commit to the selected 
mechanism, and that agents voluntarily decide to participate after learning their private information, 
so interim individual rationality is the relevant set of participation constraints. It is important that 
an uninformed third-party selects the mechanism, rather than the agents in the ex ante stage, since 
then presumably the agents would be able commit to the mechanism in the ex ante stage, so only 
ex ante individual rationality, rather than interim individual rationality, would be required. Our 
commitment assumption, while strong, is not unreasonable in an environment where contracts can 
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he enforced.1 
We allow the possibility for \earning from the ngents' participntion decisions by modeling the 
ratification process as a two stage game: a voting stage in which each player simultaneously votes 
for or against the proposed mechanism followed by a implementation stage in which either the 
proposed mechanism or the status quo is adopted, depending on whether or not the proposed mec-
hanism was unanimously ratified in the voting stage.2 A mechanism is ratifiable relative to the 
status quo if unanimous ratification is a sequential equilibrium of the two stage game, where beliefs 
following disagreement are required to satisfy consistency conditions similar to those proposed by 
Farrell (1985) and Grossman and Perry (1986). 
In many mechanism design settings, learning from disagreement is not an issue, since the status 
quo outcome is not affected by a change in the players' beliefs. For example, in bilateral trade, a 
natural status quo would be no trade (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). But in many other 
situations (and perhaps even in the bilateral trade case), equilibrium play in the status quo game 
may depend on the players' revised beliefs, conditioned on the failure to ratify the proposed 
1nechani�n1. If this is the case, then n1tification gives a player an opportunity to signal information, 
which in turn may affect the desirability of playing the status quo game. Hence, an agent's 
1 Renegotiation becomes a problem if the parties end up in a situation where everyone agrees 
to change the mechanism. This state, however, can apparently be avoided if communication is 
limited or if the agents include in their initial contract a clause requiring all parties to pay large 
sums of money to a third-p11rty in the event the contract is renegotiated: A court interested in 
efficient contracting should enforce such clauses. The argument is not so simple, however, since 
the third-party may agree to tear up the contract for a small fee, since if the contract is not torn up 
the parties will never renegotiate and so the third-party wi!l get nothing. The argument, therefore, 
rests on the assumption that the third-party is not susceptible to such bribes. 
2Maskin and Tirole's (l<J88,1990) analysis of the informed principal problem also has a 
ratification stage, but our models are quite different. In Maskin and Tirole an uninformed agent 
chooses to ratify the mechanism. Information is revealed from the informed principal's selection 
of a mechanism, rather than the ratification process. In our model, an uninformed principal selects 
the mechanism and then informed agents choose to ratify. Information is revealed from the 
ratification process, but not from the choice ()f mechanism. 
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participation decision depends on what he expects others to infer from his veto of the proposed 
mechanism. 
We now give three examples of mechanism design problems where learning during the 
ratification process is relevant. 
Cartels (Cramton and Palfrey, 1990). The firms in an industry wish to form a cartel. Each firm has 
private information about its marginal cost, as in Roberts (1985). Under the proposed (monopoly) 
mechanism, the firms announce their costs, the firm with the lowest cost produces the monopoly 
level of output, the others produce nothing, and the monopoly revenue is split among the firms 
based <ln the vector of reported costs so as to elicit truthful reports. If the proposed mechanism 
is not unanimously ratified, a status quo game consisting of (Bayesian) Cournot competition ensues: 
each firm simultaneously selects output to maximize profit given its own costs and its belief about 
the costs of the other firms and how much they will produce. But what beliefs should the firms hold 
in the event of disagreement? These beliefs are important, because they determine a firm's payoff 
in the status quo, and hence whether it should ratify the proposed mechanism. Individual rationality 
critically depends on what is inferred from a (possibly unexpected) veto of the proposed monopoly 
mechanism. 
One possibility, consistent with the standard mechanism design approach, is that nothing is 
learned from disagreement. With two firms, if the proposed mechanism has been designed to be 
incentive compatible and interim individual!y rational (assuming nothing is learned), then all types 
of firms have an interest in ratifying the mechanism, so disagreement is a zero-probability event. 
Passive beliefs (no learning) will support the proposed mechanism as a sequential equilibrium in 
this ratification game. But other beliefs are possible as we!\. 
We argue that passive updating is implausible. The ratifying firm, surprised by the disagreement 
of the other, should try to rationalize the deviation by identifying a set of types (called the veto set) 
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that could stand to benefit from vetoing. The veto set is credible if those in the veto set prefer the 
status quo game to the mechanism, and those not in the veto set prefer the mechanism to the status 
quo game, where the status quo payoffs are calculated at an equilibrium with the updated belief that 
the vetoer is in the veto set. Jn this wAy, we restrict beliefs about a vetoing firm to be a credible 
veto set of types (if one exists). 
In our cartel example, it is low-cost firms that benefit the least from participating in the cartel. 
Might a low·cost firm stand to gain by vetoing if by doing so it signalled that it had a low cost? If 
the others believe that the vetoing firm has a low cost, then they expect this firm to produce a lot 
and so they optimally respond by reducing their output, thus increasing the status quo payoff to the 
vetoing firm. Since low-cost firms gain the least from participation, this increase in the status quo 
payoff may be sufficient for them to prefer the status quo to the mechanism, but high-cost firms 
(who gain a great deal from the mechanism) would still prefer the mechanism to the status quo 
even if by vetoing a high-cost firm is able to convince the others that it is a low-cost firm. Here 
learning from disagreement has the effect of strengthening the participation constraints by 
improving the status quo payoffs for the vetoer, and therefore reduces the set of attainable 
outcomes. 
Litigation (Spulber, 1988 and Spier, 1988). A plaintiff and defendant are engaged in pretrial 
negotiation. The plaintiff has private information about her !eve\ of damages and the defendant 
has private information about his liability. They would like to settle their dispute without a trial, 
because the trial is costly to both. The propo.�erJ mechanism specifies a settlement amount and a 
probability of going to court as a function of the reports of private information. The status quo is 
going to court if the plaintiff believes bringing the case to court is profitable. If the 'case does go 
to court, each player's private informHtion is revealed during the costly discovery process and then 
the court awards to the plaintiff her damAges times the degree of liability of the defendant. 
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Notice that the defendant's status quo payoff depends on the plaintifrs decision to take the case 
to court, which in turn depends on the plaintiffs belief about the liability of the defendant. If the 
plaintiffs damages are sufficiently smflll or she believes the defendant is not sufficiently liable, then 
the plaintiff prefers not to take the case to court, since the cost of discovery and trial is greater than 
the expected award. 
What type of defendant gains the least from participating in the mechanism? If the proposed 
mechanism is incentive compatible and does not suggest going to court for plaintiffs with damages 
that are too small to make going to court profitable, then the least-liable type of defendant gains 
the least from participating in the mechanism relative to the status quo. Vetoing the mechanism 
may be a credible signal of low liability, since signaling low liability reduces the probability that the 
plaintiff will take the case to court and hence raises the defendant's status quo payoff. So long as 
defendants with high liability still gain more from the mechanism than the improved status quo, the 
low liable types form a credible veto set. Learning from disagreement in this example would have 
the same effect as in the cartel example: the learning improves the status quo payoffs for the 
vetoer, and so the set of attainable outcomes is reduced. 
Arhitmtion. A buyer and a seller are negotiating a price for an object owned by the seller. The 
buyer has private information about his reservation price, as does the seller. A mechanism specifies 
a trading price and a probability of trade as a function of the private information of the two parties. 
The status quo is either no trade or arbitration 1f both agree to arbitrate. Arbitration is a costly 
verification procedure similar to the court.-; in the litigation example. The arbitrator, through costly 
investigation, verifies the traders' reservation prices, and then has them split any gains from trade 
equally. Incentive compatibility typic<il!y implies that the highest valuation seller and the lowest 
valuation buyer gain the least from participating in such a mechanism. Can vetoing be a credible 
signal of a high value for the seller'! In this case, signaling a high type is bad for the seller in the 
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status quo game, since it reduces the probability that the buyer will be willing to bear the cost of 
arbitration. A low-value seller would h<ive no interest signaling a high type by vetoing, since the low 
type benefits more from the mechanism than a high type. Hence, unlike the last two examples, here 
learning from disagreement has the effect of reducing the status quo payoffs for the vetoer, and 
thereby expanding the set of individually rational mechanisms. 
The central feature of these examples is that the outcome of the status quo gatne depends on 
actions that the agents take based on their beliefs about private information. Thus, what is learned 
in the event that someone vetoes the mech:inism affects the vetoer's status quo payoff and therefore 
the agent's decision to participate. Individual rationality, then, depends on what is learned from 
disagreement. In order to answer the question, "What are the relevant individual rationality 
constraints?", we must first answer the question, "What beliefs should the agents have following 
disagreement?" 
Section I presents the general model and definitions. Section 2 applies the general model to 
the cartel problem studied in Cramton and Palfrey (1990). The cartel exa1nple serves to illustrate 
that even ex post efficient mechanisms that are feasible, incentive compatible, and individual!y 
rational without learning may be eliminated by refinements that place reasonable restrictions on 
beliefs following disagreement. Section 3 compares the implications of our model of learning fro1n 
disagreement with several alternatives from the literature on equilibrium refinements. 
1 Ratiliable J\1echanisms 
Consider a mechanism design problem with 11 individuals, indexed hy i EN= {l , . . . , n}, that 
must make a decision d E D. Each individual i has private information t; E Ti, representing a 
realization of all of i's information that is not common knowledge. For simplicity, we assume that 
types are independent: t,. is drawn from the di.�tribution F,., independently of t1 for j "' i. Plnyer i's 
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ex post utility u; : D x T-+ R depends on the decision and vector of types t = (t1, . • •  , tn) E T = 
T1 x · · · x T,,. A decision rule 8 : T .... D maps each vector of types into a decision. The decision 
rule 8 is implemented as a direct mechanism: the players simultaneously report their types t', 
possibly dishonestly, and then the decision 8(t') is adopted. An uninformed third-party, the 
mechanism designer, must propose a particular decision rule, recognizing incentive and participation 
constraints. Incentive constraints are dealt with by requiring that the decision rule 8 be incentive 
compatible. 8(t) is incentive compatible if, in the direct mechanism, honesty is a be�1 response for 
each player given that the others are honest. By the revelation principle, there is no loss of 
generality in requiring that the designer propose an incentive compatible decision rule. In what 
foUows, 8 will always refer to an incentive compatihle decision rule. Participation constraints are 
handled by requiring that every type of every player prefers to participate in the mechanism 8 than 
play the status quo game G. 
In the standard mechanism design approach, the participation constraints are quite simple, 
because the payoffs in the status quo game, the alternative to participation, do not depend on 
strategic actions. Often the status quo simply specifies a constant value, say U". In that case, 
interhn participation constraints are that the interim utility from the mechanism for each type of 
each player be at least U°. 
Here we allow for a status quo that depends on strategic actions. Participation constraints are 
considered by analyzing a two-stage ratification game. In the first stage, the players simultaneously 
vote to ratify the proposed mechanism 8. In the second stage, 8 is implemented if it is unanimously 
ratified, otherwise the status quo game G is played. Player i, in deciding whether to veto the 
mechanism 8, must be aware that the others' beliefs about i might change as a result of the veto, 
and this change in belief might alter i's payoff in the status quo game. 
Furthermore, the expected payoff to i in G if i vetoes depends upon the equilibrium that will 
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be played in G under the belief generated by the veto. What we attempt to do here is to link 
together i's decision to ratify or veto with rational expectations about the outcome in the 
continuation game G. 
In particular, suppose that if i vetoes 8 then the others believe that i's type t; is in some veto set 
v; � T;, v; ,.. 0.3 The status quo game is then played with the original beliefs, except all players 
other than i update their beliefs about player i's type to be F/ JV;), where F;(· IV;) denotes the 
distribution F; conditioned on the event V; c T;. Let a(V;) denote an equilibrium of G with these 
new priors, and define T./f(t;, v,, a(V;)) to be the interim payoff to i in the equilibrium a(V;) in G 
when i vetoes and the others infer i's type is in V1. Finally, let Vl'(t;) be t/s interim payoff in the 
mechanism 8, and define U,(t,., v,., a(V,.)) = U,°(t1) - u</(t1, V;, a(i:;-)) to be t/s net benefit from 8, 
relative to G, if a veto by i results in the inference that I; E V; and a(V;) is played in the continuation 
game. Let V 
= 
{V1, ... , V11} be a collection of veto sets, one for each player, and let L(V) = 
{a(Vj), . . , a(V,))
Definition. 8 is individually rational relative to the status quo G if there exists V and L(V) such that 
for each i <ind each I;, U;(t;, V,, a(V;)) � 0. 
Our definition is the standard definition of individual rationality, but now the payoff in the 
status quo can depend on what is learned from i's veto of the mechanism. Our interest in this 
definition stems from the following fact. 
3The independence of the players' types is used here, since the veto set v; when i vetoes is the 
same for all players. This simplification would not be possible with dependent types. Although 
convenient, the assumption of independence of types is far from innocuous in mechanism design 
as is demonstrated by Cremer and McLean (1988) in an auction environment. 
<) 
Proposition 1. If 8 is incentive co1npatible and individually rational relative to G, then unanimous 
ratification of 8 followed by trnthful revelation in the direct mechanis1n 8 is a sequential equilibrium in
the ratification game. 
Proor. If in equilibrium all types of all players ratify 8, then Bayes' rule implies that the prior 
beliefs are unchanged when the direct game constructed to implement 8 is played. Since 8 is  
incentive compatible, truthful revelation in  this game is  a best response following unanimous 
ratification. Consider any player i and j ,.. i. Let j's belief if i deviates by vetoing 8 be F;(t; IV.·), and 
let all players follow a(V;) in the continuation game. Given this, a veto by i in the ratification stage 
is unprofitable for any type t;, since the fact that 8 is individually rational relative to G implies that 
U;(t;, J:i, a(V;)) ;-:-; 0. a 
The proposition above is not an "if and only iP' statement, because our definition of individual 
rationality relative to the status quo game G places an additional restriction on beliefs off·the-
equilibrium-path beyond what is required for a consistent assessn1ent in a sequential equilibrium. 
Namely,j's belief about i following i's veto is the conditional distribution F;(t; 1 V;). Our assumption, 
however, that <iny two players j and k have the same belief about i after i's veto is required in a 
sequential equilibrium, because types are independent. This follows, since for the beliefs to be 
consistent they must be the limit of beliefs formed by a sequence of totally mixed strategies. 
1.t Credible Veto Sets and Ratifiability 
We now explore further restrictions on beliefs in the ratification game, based on a refinement 
proposed by Grossman and Perry (1986). In particular, we suppose that if i vetoes the mechanism, 
then the others will try to rationalize the veto by inferring that ti is in a particular veto set J.j, such 
that all types in Vi benefit from the veto, but those not in V; prefer the mechanism. If it is possible 
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to rationalize the veto in this way, then the mechanism is not individually rational in the sense that 
types in Vi can do better by vetoing. 
Definition. A nonempty subset V; of Ti is a credible veto set for i relative to the decision rule 8 and 
status quo game G if there exists some a(fij) such that: 
(i) 
(ii) 
V;(ti, V;, a(Vj)) :5 0 for all f; E V;. and 
U;(t;, v,, a(V1)) � 0 for all f; � V;. 
If V; is a credible veto set, then the others can rationalize i's veto by believing i's type is in Vi. If 
for every credible veto set there is some type f; that strictly gains by vetoing, then 8 is not ratifiable 
relative to G. 
Definition. An incentive compatible decision rule 8 is ratiftable against G if for all i either 
(i) there does not exist a credible veto set, or 
(ii) there exists a credible veto set VJ such that Ui(t,, v,., a(V;)) = 0 for all t; E V; . 
If after a veto the players' beliefs are restricted to credible veto sets when one exists, then we shoukl 
require that the mechanism be ratifiahle. For any mechanism that is not ratifiable, regardless of 
the credible veto set, there is some type of player that strictly benefits from vetoing. This definition 
is in the spirit of perfect sequential equilibrium (Gn"-�sman and Perry, 1986). 
Remark 1. It is certainly possible that 8 and G are such that no credible veto sets exist. Jn this case, 
8 is ratifiable, the participation constraints are not binding, and the beliefs following disagreement 
are indeterminate (and inconsequential). However, in many settings, the participation constraints 
are binding, provided the incentive problem is severe enough and the mechanism designer chooses 
8 to be optimal in some sense. Such a mechanism typically is associated with the existence of a 
I I  
credible veto set for each i with the property that all types in V; are indifferent between ratifying 
and vetoing. In this case, the beliefs following disagreement are required to put all the weight on 
those types that gain the least from participating in the mechanism 8 relative to G. 
Remark 2. A well-known difficulty with the perfect sequential equilibrium (PSE) concept is that 
PSE sometimes fail to exist. Because of the similarity of our notion of ratifiability to PSE, we must 
address the possibility that for some G, the set of ratifiable mechanisms relative to G may be empty. 
This, however, is never the case. Let a(T;) be any equilibrium to G under the prior beliefs. Let 
S be the decision rule generated by a(Ti). Then 8 is always ratifiable against G, since for each i, 
T; is a credible veto set with Ui(ti, T;, a(Ti)) = 0 for all ti E Ti. 
Remark 3. It is possible that there is more than one way to rationalize a veto by player i. In that 
case, there will be more than one credible set for i. In fact, it is possible that for one of i's credible 
sets, say Vj, U;(t;, V;, a(Vi)) = 0 for all ti E Vi but for another of i's credible sets, say V/, 
U;(t;, v;, a(Vi)) < 0 for some t; E v;. In this case, the mechanism would be ratifiable, as long as 
appropriate credible veto sets could be found for all j � i, even though there existed a credible veto 
set for i, v;, that would make some i-types better off under the status quo than under the proposed 
mechanism. This problem of multiple credible veto sets will be addressed later in the paper. The 
issue is whether part (ii) of the definition of ratifiability .should be required to bold for alt credible 
veto sets. This, however, is not an issue if there is at most one credible set for any i. 
1.2 Strong Rafiliability 
As pointed out in Grossman and Perry ( 1986), there is a subtle difference between their 
definition of PSE and a related equilibrium refinement proposed by Farrell (1985). Farrell's 
refinement, neologfrni-proof, differs from PSE because it requires an equilibrium to be supported 
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hy all, rather than one, credible updating rules for rationalizing observations off the equilibrium 
path. If neologism-proofness is applied in our framework of ratifiability instead of PSE, we get a 
strengthening of our definition of ratifiahility. 
Definition. An incentive compatible mechanism S is strongly ratifiahle against G if for all i eilher 
(i) there does not exist a credible veto set, or 
(ii) for every credible veto set V1, U,.(t;, V,, a(V;)) = 0 for a!! t; EV;.
In other words, if S is strongly ratifiable against G, then there does not exist a credible veto set for 
any player such that some type in that veto set strictly prefers the status quo to the mechanism. 
Any mechanism that is strongly ratifiab!e is ratifi<ible because part (ii) of the definition must hold 
for all credible sets, rather than just one. 
In contrast to the definition of ratifinble, it may be that the status quo G is not strongly 
ratifiahle against itself (or, more precisely, G is not strongly ratifiable against a decision rule 
produced at some equilibrium of G). There may be a credible set of types V;,,. Ti such that at least . 
one type ti strictly prefers an equilibrium in the status quo game with the revised beliefs V; relative 
to the status quo with beliefs T;. Such a game would not be impervious to allowing players to make 
binary preplay announcements ("Veto" or "Ratify") that may communicate information about their 
types. Thus, we can interpret the idea of a mechanism being strongly ratifiahle against itself as 
permitting a special sort of preplay communication before G is carried Out� Tn this way we see 
that strong ratifiability implies some degree nf cheap-talk proofness. 
4 Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite ( 1989) provide an interesting analysis of pre-play 
communication in Bayesian games that is relevant here. As in Farrell (1985), their pre-play 
communication is cheap talk (it does not affect payoffs directly) hut they allow a richer structure. 
In particular, different deviant types may send different tnessages. The communication in our 
model is quite different, since it stems from the binary decision to ratify. Communication in our 
model is not cheap talk and naturally splits the set of types into two subsets- those that vetoed and 
those that ratified the mechanism. 
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2 Ratifiability of Cartel Agreements with a Cournot Threat 
We now turn to an example from Cramton and Palfrey (1990) that illustrates how learning from 
disagreement can affect the set of ratifiable mechanisms. Whether learning from disagreement 
strengthens or weakens the participation constraints depends in general on the particular 
mechanism 5. In our example, even though the status quo G is fixed, participation constraints are 
sometimes strengthened by learning from disagreement and sometimes weakened depending on the 
proposed mechanism 8. 
Two firms produce in an industry. Each firm's marginal cost ci is private information and drawn 
independently from the uniform distribution on [O, I]. Inverse demand isp(q1, q2) 
= 
1 - q1 - q2, 
where qi is the production of firm i. Both firms seek to maximize their interim profit. The status
quo G is Bayesian Cournot competition: each firm i chooses q1 to maximize its expected profit
given its cost c; and its belief about j's production. A mechanism S specifies how much each firm 
produces and how the industry revenue is divided between the firms as a function of their reported 
costs. We con.sider two different mechanisms. The first, joint monopoly, illustrates that learning 
from disagreement can strengthen the participation constraints - although joint monopoly is 
attainable without learning, it is not strongly ratifiable. The second, a minimum quantity restriction, 
demonstrates that learning from disagreement can have the opposite affect - although no minimum 
quantity restriction is individually rational without !earning, it is ratifiable. 
2.1 Joint-Monopoly l\1echanisms
Let 8 be the joint monopoly outcome: the lowest-cost firm produces the monopoly output and
the other produces nothing with the revenue divided in such a way that 8 is incentive compatible.
Using the standard mechanism design approach, one can show that it is possible to split up the 
revenue in such a way as to satisfy interim individual rationality assuming nothing is learned from 
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disagreement (that is, the status quo of Cournot competition is played with the prior beliefs). Tn 
this mechanism without learning, the worst-off type,(; "" 0.2200, expects to get 0.0999 in profits from 
the joint-monopoly mechanism and only 0.093 in the Cournot game. 
But is the joint-monopoly mechanism ratifiable against Cournot competition? To answer this 
question, we need to ask: what should firmj think (and consequently how much should it produce} 
if firm i vetoes the n1onopo!y mechanis1n? Does there exist a set of types V ; (a credible veto set) 
that can make the following speech: 
"I voted against this mechanism because my type is in V;. If you believe me and I am telling 
you the truth, then my payoff in the Cournot game is better than what I get in the mechan­
ism. Moreover, if my type is not in V;, I would get a strictly higher payoff from the mechan­
ism than from the Cournot game in which you believe my type is in V; and so I would not 
want to vote against the mechanism. Hence, you should believe me." 
If such a credible veto set exists (and there is no other veto set satisfying (ii) of the definition of 
ratifiability), then the monopoly mechanism is not ratifiable. This turns out to be the case, as we 
demonstrate below. 
The intuition for why a credible veto set exists here is straightforward. In the monopoly 
mechanism, high-cost firms gain a great deal by particip<iting, whereas low-cost firms gain little. By 
vetoing the monopoly mechanism, a firm sends a credible signal that it has a relatively low cost. 
Since a firm with a low cost produces a relatively large amount in the Cournot status quo, the other 
firm will respond optimally by producing less in G than it would with its prior beliefs. This
reduction of output by the other firm increases the profit to the vetoing firm in the status quo -
enough, in fact, to make a vetoer with sufficiently low cost prefer the Cournot outcmne to the 
monopoly mechanism. A low-cost firm's signal is credible, since a high-cost firm stiU does better 
in the monopoly mechanism, despite the improved status quo that results from vetoing. 
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Proposition 2. The 1nonopoly n1echanis111 is not ratifiable against the status quo of Cournot
competition. 
Proof Sketch. The idea behind the proof is that a mechanism is ratifiable only if the ratifier's 
expected output is sufficiently high in the status quo game following a veto. As the ratifier's 
expected output increases in the Cournot game, the vetoer's output in the Cournot game declines. 
In fact, it can be shown that for <1ny beliefs fo!lowing a veto, the subsequent equilibrium in the 
Cournot game will have the vetoer produce if and only if its cost is less than some amount. For 
future reference, denote such a critical cost level for the vetoer by cv(V), where V denotes beliefs 
the ratifier has about the veto set. We then show that whenever Vis such that cv(V) ::5 .8515 then 
the vetoer will be worse off in the subsequent Cournot game that it would be in the monopoly 
mechanism. Finally, we show that the unique credible veto set, V, is the interval [0,.444] which
results in a value of c,,(V) = .89 > .8515. See the appendix for details.• 
Learning in this case has the effect of strengthening the participation constraints. If a veto 
resulted in passive inferences (i.e. no updating}, then the monopoly mechanism is individually 
rational relative to the stCltus quo alternative of Cournot competition. But if the inferences are 
required to satisfy our credibility conditions, then the monopoly mechanism will not be unanimously 
ratified by all types of all players. 
2.2 Minimum Quantity Restrictions 
The effect of our credibility requirement is not always to strengthen the participation 
constraints. We demonstrate this below in the context of the same duopoly example, but with a 
different proposed mechanism. In particular, let i5 be the decision rule associated with the (unique)
equilibrium outcome from Cournot competition with a minimum quantity restriction Q (i.e. if a firm 
"' 
decides to produce it must produce at !east Q). 
Proposition 3. For Q sufficiently small, Cournot co111petition with a 111inin1um quantity restn'ction of
Q is ratifiahle against the status quo alterative with no quantity restriction, but for all Q > 0 .such a 
niecha11is111 is not individually rational with pas.1·ive updating. 
Proof. See the appendix. • 
The intuition behind this example is straightforward. A high-cost firm that would produce an 
amount much less than Q in the status quo game, and receive a small profit, finds it unprofitable 
to produce with the minimum quantity restriction, and so gets zero. Such a firm would veto the 
minimum quantity restriction in favor of the status quo if the status quo is played with the prior 
beliefs. But it_ is credible for the r<itifier to infer that vetoer h<is a high cost as a result of the veto, 
which makes the veto unprofitable. Hence, with learning no type wants to veto. 
3 Alternative Formulations of Ratitiability 
The issue of ratifiability is closely intertwined with the issue of defining beliefs "off the 
equilibrium path" in a game of incomplete information. Our definition of ratifiability challenges 
the notion that any beliefs, and in particular passive beliefs, can follow an unexpected veto. 
Jn the last several years, a considerable literature on "equilibrium refinements" has built up 
around precisely this problem of specifying plausible beliefs off the equilibrium path. We now 
compare our choice of refinement and its implications for ratifiability to some alternative refine­
ments. The purpose of this section is to motivate and clarify why we settled on a definition of 
ratifiability based on the refinement of Grossman and Perry ( 1986). The main problem with the 
other refinements is that they generally violate a natural "rational expectations'' requirement that 
ratifiabi!ity satisfies: those types th:1t are believed to have vetoed are precisely the types that 
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benefit from vetoing if everyone believes that they are the types to veto. 
To save space, formal definitions are omitted and instead we show how these alternative 
refinements would apply to the duopo!J problem annlyzed in the previous section. with costs 
uniformly distributed on [O, l} and G given by Cournot competition. As in the first part of the last
section, let 8 be the monopoly mechanism. In this section we are interested in determining whether 
the monopoly mechanism is ratifiable relative to the Cournot status quo, but where ratifiability is 
not defined relative to "credible veto sets" but relative to veto sets that satisfy restrictions derived 
from alternative refinements. In particular, we investigate three refinements: the intuitive criterion, 
divinity, and universal divinity. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to restate one property of ratifiable mechanisms in the context 
of our duopoly example. Recall that in the proof of Proposition 2, we showed that 8 is ratifiable
relative to G, so long as the veto set Vis such that the highest-cost vetoer to produce is sufficiently 
small (cv(T0 :S .8515), or equivrilently, if the ratifier's expected output is sufficiently high in G. In
fact, this is true regardless of which refinement concept we use to place restrictions on veto sets. 
Hence, 8 is ratifiable against G relative to a particulnr refinement if the refinement allows a veto 
set V such that cv(V) :S .8515. 
3.1 The Intuitive Criterion 
The intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) requires that beliefs be concentrated on those types 
for whom there exists some belief such that if the ratifying firm inferred those beliefs from a veto, 
then this type of firm would wish to veto. In other words, no weight can be put on types for whom 
the deviation of vetoing is "bad" in the sense that the vetoer surely loses from the deviation (prefers 
the mechanism to the status quo) regardless of what belief the veto induced on the other firm. 
This is a much weaker requirement than the one we proposed in the previous section. If a 
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mechanism is ratifiahle relative to the status quo, then there will always he a sequential equilibrium 
of the ratification game where everyone ratifies the mechanism and beliefs satisfy the intuitive 
criterion. Tn fact, for this example, there are beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion that support 
the monopoly mechanism. This is demonstrated helow. 
We begin by calculating the helievahle set, the set of types for which there exists some belief that 
makes vetoing profitah!e. Regardless of type, the belief that makes vetoing the most profitable is 
c = 0, hecause it leads to the smallest production by the other firm in the status quo. Therefore, 
type c is helievah\e if c does at least as well hy vetoing the mechanism if the ratifying firm infers 
that the vetoer's cost is 0. With beliefs V = {O}, c,. = .93. Beliefs must be concentrated on types 
for whom U(c,{O}) :S 0, which implies that the believable set is {O, .562]. 
The belief for the ratifier satisfying the intuitive criterion that is most apt to support the 
monopoly mechanism is the most opti111istic belief; namely, for the ratifier to infer that the vetoers 
cost is the largest believable type c 
= .562. It is easy to verify that such a belief supports the 
monopoly mechanism: all types prefer the monopoly outcome to the status quo when by vetoing 
the mechanism the vetoer reveals th:it its cost is .562. For beliefs V = {.562}, cv < .8515, so the 
monopoly mechanism is ratifiahle under the intuitive criterion. 
The intuitive criterion is a weak refinement in this application, nnd similar applications with a 
continuum of types, because of the extreme beliefs thnt it allows. The believable set is defined by 
the ratifying firm making the 1nost pessilnistic inference (c ""° 0), but then the individual rationality 
constraint is determined by making the niost opti111istic inference (c = .562). The intuitive criterion 
allows beliefs that are far from consistent in a rational expectations sense. 
3.2 Divinity 
The divinity refinement (Banks and Sobel, 1987) goes one step further than the intuitive 
' " 
criterion by imposing a monotonicity condition on beliefs in the believable set For any two 
believable types, t and t', with the property that the set of beliefs under which t prefers to veto 
strictly contains the set of beliefs under which t' prefers to veto, divine beliefs must have a higher 
likelihood ratio oft tot' than the prior likelihood ratio between the two types. As in the intuitive 
criterion, we must find the most optimi.�tic belief possible, but subject to the likelihood ratio 
constraint. It is easy to show that the most optimistic divine belief is simply the truncated prior on 
the believable set. In our example, this reduces to a uniform posterior on the believable set. With 
this belief, a veto of the mechanism will result in Cournot competition in which the vetoer believes 
that the ratifying firm's cost is uniformly distributed on [0,1] and the ratifier believes that the 
vetoing firm's cost is uniform on [O, .562]. With V == [O, .562], cv "" .878 > .8515, so the monopoly 
mechanism is not ratifiable with divine beliefs. In our example, divinity is strong enough to 
eliminate the monopoly outcome. 
3.3 Universal Divinity 
The stronger refinement of universal divinity (Banks and Sobel, 1987) is a strengthening of 
divinity that requires the likelihood ratio condition to hold relative to any prior, not just the original 
prior. This condition essentially requires that a belief places zero probability not only on types 
outside the believable set, but also on most other types as well. Which types must receive zero 
probability is determined in the following way. For every belief p concentrated on the believable 
set, let C(p) denote the set of types who are at least as well off vetoing the monopoly mechanism 
and playing the Cournot game in which the ratifier has these beliefs about the vetoer's type and the 
vetoer has the original prior about the ratifier, and let C(p) denote the set of types who strictly 
prefer vetoing the monopoly mechanism when the ratifier has beliefs pin the status quo. A type 
c must receive zero probability in a universally divine belief if for every belief pin the believable 
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set, if c E C(p) then there exists another type c' E C(p).
If the payoff structure of a game possesses a monotonic structure in types, universally divine 
beliefs are concentrated at one point, corresponding to the type which, at least for some beliefs p 
in the believable set, is the unique member of C(p) and, for all p' concentrated in the believable 
set, is in C(p') whenever any other type is in C(p'). More generally, this criterion reduces to a 
set of types, which can be ca!led the unil'ersa!ly dil'ine set. This set will include (at least) every type 
for which there exists some belief p concentn1ted in the believable set with the property that that 
type is the unique element of C(p) and will exclude every element which is never a unique element 
of C(p) for any p concentrated in the believable set. 
Tn our example, universally divine beliefs are not difficult to calculate, since there is a unique 
type in the universally divine set; namely, 2 = 1/2 - (c,, - 3/4)112 where c,, = .8515, so 2 = . 1814.
[A belief that yields c,. = .8515 is V = {.3912).] It is easy to show that with beliefs concentrated 
on .1814, a nonempty range of types ::;trictly prefer to veto. Therefore, the monopoly mechanism 
is not universally divine. 
Although divinity and universal divinity are able to eliminate the monopoly mechanism in our 
example, we find them less appealing th;1n our refinement, because, like the intuitive criterion, 
divine and universally divine beliefs are not consistent in a rational expectations sense. The set of 
types who benefit from vetoing is different from the set of types who are assumed to have vetoed 
the mechanism. 
4 Conclusion 
A basic tenet of most studies in mechanii;1n design is that the parties voluntarily decide to 
participate in a proposed mechanism. Indeed, if participation constraints are ignored, then it 
typically is possihle to overcome incentive problems caused hy informational differences. Our 
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purpose in this paper has been to take a cl()ser look at participation constraints and a party's 
decision to participate. Central to this goal is specifying what happens if the parties fail to agree 
to participate in a proposed mechanism. We consider situations where the appropriate "status quo" 
is a noncooperative game, rather than some constant payoff.5 In this case, the status quo payoffs 
may depend on inferences based on the parties' participation decisions. Participation constraints, 
then, depen.d on the beliefs the parties hold following a veto of the proposed mechanism. This 
paper hns proposed and illustr,tted a concept of ratifi11bility that takes into account in a consistent 
way the dependence of beliefs on inferences from a veto. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2. We first calculate the unique credible veto set V. Since the two firms are 
symmetric ex ante, we can drop the suhscripts i and j in what follows. Furthermore, it is easy to 
show that for any veto set V there is a unique equilibrium a in G, so we suppress v<f's dependence 
on a(V). We need to calculate the interim payoffs from the monopoly mechanism U}'(c) and from 
the status quo iff(c, V) for every c and every V. The first is easy to compute from a formula in 
Cramton and Palfrey (1990): 
Uf(c) = [1/8 + (1 - c)3]/6. 
The second function is harder to derive because the strategies for the two firms differ, since each 
firm has different beliefs about the other. 
Denote the vetoer's strategy by q,,(c,V) and the ratifier's strategy by q,(c,V). In either case, the 
strate&'Y depends on a single cost level at which the firm is indifferent between producing and not. 
50ur analysis says little ahout situations where the status quo is not specified. In such a setting, 
the mechanism designer may wish to identify an institution (a status quo) that can withstand 
competition from alternative institutions. Our concept of ratifiability can be used to define what 
is meant by a status quo th.tt can withstand competition. N:imely, we can define a "stable status 
quo" to he a game for which no alternative mechanism can be ratified in favor of the status quo. 
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Let c,.(V) and c,(V) be the indifference cost levels for the vetoer anJ ratifier respectively. Then 
_ { (c,.(V) - c)/2 
q..(c, V) -
0 
if c < c,.(V) 
if c � c,.(V) 
_ { (c,(V) - c)/2 
q,(c, V) -
0 
if c < c,(V) 
if c � c,(V) 
Let Q1.(V) and Q,(V) be the expected output of the vetoer and the ratifier, respectively. Then the 
cost levels at which a firm is indifferent between producing and not are 
(Cv) c,.(V) = 1 - Q,(V), and 
(Cr) c,.( V) = 1 - Q,,(V). 
The vetoer calculates the ratifier's expected output with the prior belief, since the vetn is a 
unilateral deviation. Thus, 
(Qr) Q1(V) = 11 q,.(c, V)dc = }c,(vf . 
Suppose Vis an interval [1, h]. Then the ratifier calculates the vetoer's expected output to be 
(Qv) Q,.(V) = J 
'' q,.(c,V) .i_ � de
0 if c,.(V) s 1 
(c,(V) - 2'f 
4 (h - ') if £ < 
c,,(V) < h 
}(c..(V) - (2 ·+ h}/2) if c,.(V) � /J .
The equilibrium in the status quo with beliefs V = [1. /I] is found by solving equations (Cr), (Cv), 
(Qr), and (Qv) for cr(V), cJV), Q,.(V), and Q,.(V). The vetoer's payoff in the status quo then is 
u'f(c,V) = q,.(c,V)' . 
Let U(c,V) = U;5(c) - cfJ(c,V). For a veto set to he credible, it must be that 
(CV) U(c,V) s 0 for 1dl c E V and U(c.V) :;:= 0 for all c tI: V. 
First, notice that U(c,V) > O for all c � c,.(V), so V cannot contain c � c,,(V). For c < c,,(V), 
U(c,V) is given by the cubic equation 
n 
U(c,V) = ( 1/8 + ( I  - c)')/6 - (c,,(V) - cf /4.
Thus, for any V, U(c,V) is parameterized by the single cut-off level cv E [.75, .93] (c,. = .75 for V = 
{ 1 }  and cv = .93 for V = {O} ). It is easy to show that U(c,V) is ( 1) continuous, (2) decreasing for 
c near 0, (3) has a minimum at c = C = 1/2 - (c,, - 3/4)112, (4) has a point of inflection at c = 
1/2, and (5) has a maximum at c = 1/2 + (cv - 3/4)112 . Hence, 8 is individually rational relative 
to G if and only if V is such that c,. is sufficiently small. Calculation shows that this critical cutoff 
level is c,, = .8515. Moreover, the only c<1ndidate for a credible veto set is an interval [i,h] around 
l". One such veto set takes the form V = [O, h], whereh < cv(VJ is such that Ul(h) = u<[(h,V); that 
;s, /V iolves (l/8 + ( l - h)')/6 = ((c,.(V) - h)/2'/ and c,,(V) solves (Cr), (Cv), (Qr), and (Qv). These 
equations are satisfied when h = .444. In this case, cr(V) = .67, c,,(V) = .89, Q,(V) = . 1 11,  Q11(V) 
= .333, U;'\h) = u<[(h,V) 
= .0496, <tnd (CV) is satisfied, since U(O,V) < 0. This veto set is unique, 
since raising It decreases cv, so U(h,V) > 0 and h will no longer want to veto. • 
Proof of Proposition 3. We must show that for small Q there exits a credible set V which satisfies 
(ii) of the definition of ratifiabi!ity. Under 8, the two firms simultaneously select output levels q1 
and q2 subject to the constraint that if lf; > 0 then qi � Q. The status quo G is the same as before: 
Cournot competition without quantity restrictions. A unique equilibrium is characterized for each 
Q by two cutoff levels, 1 and h, with 1 s h. Each firm produces 
{ O if c > h  
q(c) = Q if 1 s c s h 
Q + .:_(£ - c) if c < i2 ' 
where the cutoff levels are determined from the equ<1tions 
Q 
= (h - ')/2, ""d f/4 = 1 - ( l + Q)h. 
If Q = 0, then this mechanism is simply Cournot competition with the prior beliefs, and £ = h = 
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.83. As Q increases, both £ and h decrease. This means th;H, relative to the status quo with the 
original priors, no such mechanism is individual!y rational with passive beliefs: a firm with costs 
slightly below .83 makes 0 in the mechanism but would make some small positive profit under 
Cournot competition. 
This ignores the inferences that the other firm would make if such a firm were to veto. 
Intuition suggests that a vetoing firm will be suspected of having high costs, thereby destroying any 
benefits a high cost firm could get from vetoing the minimum-quantity mechanism. In fact, this 
intuition is correct for sufficiently small V<l\ues of Q. For small Q, one credible set is simply the 
highest cost type, c "' 1. Such an inference from a veto will le<ld a ratifying firm to produce much 
more in the status quo than it would under its original priors, which makes all types (weakly) prefer 
the mechanism to the status quo. A c "'  1 type earns zero profits in either case, so vetoing or 
ratifying by such a type can be rationalized. Thus, a minimum quantity restriction is a ratifiable 
1nechanism, even though it is not individually rational with passive updating. m 
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